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“You can map out a fight plan or a life plan, but when the action starts, it 
may not go the way you planned, and you’re down to your reflexes - that means 
your [preparation]. That’s where your roadwork shows. If you cheated on that in 
the dark of the morning, well, you’re going to get found out now, under the bright 
lights.”1 
 INTRODUCTION 
Modern government regulates all walks of American life. As the 
backbone of that governance, federal agencies promulgate rules and 
regulations in their field of expertise.2 Congress commands, and agencies 
interpret, applying those interpretations to their rules and adjudications, thus 
binding parties.3 
Courts have long deferred to an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous rule or statute, in light of the agency’s relevant technical expertise.4 
But some judges prefer that Article III courts review everything;5 and deferring 
often involves relying on an agency’s interpretation of a genuinely ambiguous 
statute—the oft-discussed Chevron deference doctrine.6 This Article analyzes 
the more nuanced Auer deference, where a court defers to an agency’s later 
interpretation of its own ambiguous rule or regulation.7 Recently, the Supreme 
Court took and decided Kisor v. Wilkie,8 which dramatically modified the Auer 
doctrine.9 While Kisor appealed a claim for veteran’s benefits that implicated 
the courts’ ability to review Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) findings, the 
Court took it up to answer a bigger question: Should Auer be overruled? 
They did not—but just barely—overrule it, in ways that dramatically 
limit the times and ways in which courts will defer. Kisor has had and will have 
far-reaching effects on all agencies. This Article discusses one: the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).10 Like other agencies, the USPTO 
issues rules, regulations, and guidance and has adjudicators—here 
 
 1.  Commonly attributed to Joe Frazier. 
 2.   5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 3.   About PTAB, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/about-ptab 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2019). 
 4.   See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (stating that agencies have unique 
technical expertise, relevant to applying a regulation to complex or changing circumstances). 
 5.   See Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103 (2018) (voicing Article III concerns regarding Chevron and Auer 
deference). 
 6.   See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 7.   Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). 
 8.   139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 9.   Id. at 2415. 
 10.   About Us, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (explaining the USPTO’s background as a federal agency and how it 
operates). 
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Administrative Patent Judges (“APJs”)—who preside over disputes at the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”).11 But the USPTO is unique in that, in 
the regulatory grant of patents, it generates hundreds of thousands of new 
regulations annually, namely the Federal ability to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling a patented invention.12 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the history of agency 
deference and the previous tests that courts have developed regarding 
deference. Part II explores the legal analysis behind Kisor, and the new test to 
be applied. Part III explains how the Federal Circuit has applied deference (or 
not) to USPTO decisions, particularly in Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal and 
Facebook v. Windy City.13 Part IV explores the effects of Kisor on the rulemaking 
procedures at the USPTO and recommends procedures the agency can adopt 
for ensuring that USPTO decisions merit Auer deference after Kisor. 
I. AGENCY DEFERENCE BACKGROUND 
But first, some background on the much-dissected deference doctrines 
is in order. Deference doctrines have their roots in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).14 Enacted in 1946, the APA governs how federal 
agencies develop and issue regulations.15 Under the APA, federal agencies may 
promulgate formal, informal, and interpretive regulations.16 Informal 
rulemaking is the most widely used form.17 Informal regulations are 
promulgated through public notice-and-comment procedures.18 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is meant to apprise the public of 
agency plans regarding a particular rule; thus, proposed rules are published in 
 
 11.   Id.; Patent Trial and Appeal Board, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
process/patenttrialandappealboard (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 12.   General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-
getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-2 (last visited Oct. 13, 2019). 
 13.   872 F.3d 1290, 1327–8 (Fed. Cir. 2017); 953 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a 
federal appellate court whose jurisdiction is wholly based on subject matter rather than 
geography).  The Federal Circuit hears all cases appealed from the USPTO and has jurisdiction over 
all patent cases appealed from district courts. Id. 
 14.   5 U.S.C § 551 (2012). 
 15.   Id. 
 16.  See Todd Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative 
Regulation, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 159, 163–167 (2000) (discussing the history of the APA and 
rulemaking, and the use of formal, informal, and interpretive regulation, in addition to guidance 
and policy statements, emphasizing a shift toward the informal). 
 17.   See ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 276 (2016).  
Formal rulemaking involves a trial-like proceeding and formal hearings; everything must be on the 
record.  Id.  However, such rulemaking is uncommon because its trial-like procedures make the 
resulting process slow and expensive.  Id.  Because formal rulemaking has not been used 
extensively by the USPTO, this Comment will discuss only informal rulemaking and interpretive 
guidance. 
 18.   5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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the Federal Register.19 Other interpretive regulations do not require publishing 
comments in the Federal Register.20 Informal regulations promulgated through 
notice-and-comment are legally binding; interpretive regulations are not.21 
The deference accorded to an agency’s interpretation depends on 
whether the provision is legally binding.22 For instance, agencies’ reasonable 
interpretations of ambiguous parts of their governing statutory provisions 
receive deference under Chevron.23 Interpretations of the agency’s own 
regulations are entitled to deference under Auer v. Robbins,24 so long as they 
are not “plainly erroneous” or “inconsistent with the regulations.”25 Given their 
technical expertise, an agency is normally best equipped to construe any 
ambiguity in its own regulations under Auer.26 In contrast, when interpreting 
non-binding agency action, courts offer respect rather than deference to the 
agency’s reasoning under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.27 Per this “Skidmore 
respect,”28 courts only accede to persuasive agency reasoning.29 
With that, let us turn back now to Kisor, and that case’s background. 
 
 
 19.   5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (explaining that notice-and-comment requirements under the APA 
ensure that the public is aware of an action that a federal agency plans to take). 
 20.   See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019).  Interpretive rules are meant only to 
“advise the public” of how the agency understands, and is likely to apply, its binding statutes and 
legislative rules.  Id. 
 21.   Id. 
 22.   See Thomas Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded them Offer 
Insight into the Procedural Inquiry? 90 B.U. L. REV. 1303, 1303–04 (2010) (detailing the divide 
between legally binding and non-binding rules); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing 
Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 551 (2000) (generally, same). 
Cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 
514–16 (urging courts should interpret Congressional delegations of authority broadly, but 
questioning the soundless of deferring per se). 
 23.   See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–3 (explaining that there is a two-part test for determining 
whether a court should apply deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation). 
 24.   519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 25.   Id. (explaining that an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous rule or regulation is 
controlling unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”); see also Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).  Seminole Rock preceded Auer. 
 26.   See Auer, 519 U.S. at 453 (1997); see also David E. Boundy, The PTAB Is Not an Article III 
Court: A Primer on Federal Agency Rule Making, 10 LANDSLIDE 9, 52–3 (2017). In Kisor, Justice Kagan 
compares deferring to an agency’s gap-filling to asking an author how they meant to write 
something. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412. 
 27.   323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). 
 28.   See id. 
 29.   Id.; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159 (2012) (following 
the agency’s view only to the extent that it is persuasive). 
THE ELEVENTH AUER 6/3/2020  11:39 AM 
490 CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.| PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION Vol 19:4 
II.  KISOR’S BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The eponymous James Kisor’s journey to the Supreme Court was 
hardly a quick one. In 1982, James Kisor, a Vietnam War veteran, sought 
disability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), alleging he 
had developed post-traumatic stress disorder from his military service.30 The 
Agency denied his request, and, in 2006, Kisor moved to reopen his claim.31 
This time the VA agreed, but granted benefits only from the date of his motion.32 
Kisor appealed to the Board of Veteran’s Appeals (“BVA”), which affirmed the 
VA’s decision based on the agency’s interpretation of the relevant regulation, 
which governs reconsideration of a veteran’s claim if supported by “revenant 
official service department records” that had not been previously associated 
with the veteran’s claim.33 Kisor appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s 
Claims, lost, and then appealed to the Federal Circuit.34 The Federal Circuit 
applied Auer, holding that the agency’s regulation was “genuinely ambiguous,” 
and affirmed the VA’s decision.35 Kisor appealed to the Supreme Court, and they 
granted certiorari on whether Auer should be overruled.36 
Before the Court ruled, many predicted Kisor would be the case to 
overturn Auer in favor of Skidmore, one author included.37 Instead, a bare 
majority of justices preserved Auer, with the Court issuing three concurring 
opinions and Chief Justice Roberts joining only parts of the majority opinion, 
making it at times a bare plurality.38 Auer deference survived, but just barely. 
The majority (and in part, plurality)39 opinion, authored by Justice Kagan, 
 
 30.   See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 31.   Id. 
 32.   Id. 
 33.   Id.; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1) (2013) (describing the benefits available to Kisor if 
there were “relevant official records”).  The Federal Circuit found the term “relevant” ambiguous.  
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 34.   See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 35.   Id. at 2410; see also Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1368 (2017). 
 36.   Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2409. 
 37.   E.g., Jonathan Stroud, The US Supreme Court’s Biggest Patent Case This Year Has Nothing 
to do With Patents, IAM (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/years-biggest-
patent-case-supreme-court-has-nothing-do-patents (predicting the court would overturn Auer). 
 38.   See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2424–25. 
 39.   As other respected voices have explained the split opinion, “Chief Justice Roberts joined 
the plurality opinion establishing the new framework, creating a five-justice majority. He also 
joined the section of the opinion concluding that “stare decisis cuts strongly against 
[abrogating Auer deference.]”  To the majority, Auer deference should only be abrogated if it is truly 
“unworkable,” which the majority did not find the doctrine to be.  However, Chief Justice Roberts 
did not join the plurality’s explanation of Auer deference’s origin nor its policy justifications for the 
doctrine’s existence, even in its new form.”  Shamita Etienne–Cummings & David M. Tennant, Alert: 
Kisor Deference: The New Judicially-Driven Auer Deference, White & Case (Jul. 17, 2019), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/kisor-deference-new-judicially-driven-auer-
deference (last visited Mar. 12, 2020). 
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modified the existing Auer doctrine with a multi-step, multi-factor test.40 It 
advised that Auer deference was inappropriate unless, after exhausting all the 
“traditional tools of construction,” the regulation remains “genuinely 
ambiguous,” and it stressed that the test was not exhaustive.41 Chief Justice 
Roberts joined the sections related to the new test and the sections professing 
the importance of stare decisis, but did not join those discussing the origins of 
and reasoning behind Auer, leaving those without precedential effect. 
A. Kisor’s Legal Framework 
Justice Kagan’s majority opined that, before concluding a rule is 
genuinely ambiguous, one must exhaust all “traditional tools of construction” 
in Chevron step one.42 If genuine ambiguity remains, a court should defer so 
long as the agency’s reading is reasonable.43 She added that some agency-
promulgated regulations shouldn’t receive Auer deference—a court must 
consider context.44 In doing so, Justice Kagan explained, the agency’s 
interpretation must (1) be its official position; (2) implicate its substantive 
expertise; and (3) reflect its “fair and considered judgment.”45 
She noted that, as Congress delegates rulemaking power to agencies 
alone, so too should the rules reflect the agencies’ official positions.46 A court 
should not defer if the rule is not the agency’s official position or “does not 
emanate from those designated actors” Congress sought to authorize.47 Justice 
Kagan noted it would lack sense to defer to an agency’s interpretation if it does 
not have expertise in the rule’s technical application.48 She added an agency’s 
interpretation must reflect “fair and considered judgment.”49 Justice Kagan 
found that the Federal Circuit had “jumped the gun” in declaring the regulation 
 
 40.   See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–17. 
 41.   Id. at 2415 (stating that if genuine ambiguity remains, then the agency’s reading must still 
be “reasonable”). 
 42.   See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U. S. at 843, n.9 (1984) (illustrating the Chevron steps).  
Chevron step one involves determining whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue.  Id.  The 
court employs a “traditional tools of construction” analysis, which involves reviewing the 
regulation’s text, structure, history, and purpose, as if there was no federal agency to fall back on.  
Id.  Step two involves determining whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible.  
Id. 
 43.   Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 44.   Id. 
 45.   Id. at 2416–17. 
 46.   Id. at 2416. 
 47.   See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that, historically, courts have not offered deference to an agency’s interpretation when 
it comes from a mid-level official); see also Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018). 
 48.   Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 49.   Id. at 2417. 
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ambiguous and admonished that the panel assumed too quickly that Congress 
had intended Auer deference to apply.50 
Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas (and, in parts, Justice 
Kavanaugh and Justice Alito), filed a lengthy concurrence in which he disagreed 
with most of the majority’s (and plurality’s) points,51 hinting at the direction 
the Court may be headed on deference given the positions of the younger 
conservative members and the aging liberal bloc.52 He contended that Auer 
undermines the distinction between informal and interpretive rulemaking 
procedures in the APA.53  He argued that Auer “sits uneasily with the 
Constitution,”54 and that agencies may have underlying political agendas, and 
therefore may lack the impartiality that an Article III court offers55 he would 
instead have overruled Auer, replacing it with the softer Skidmore respect.56 He 
also contended that the new Auer formula will do more harm than good, given 
its multiple steps and guidelines,57 and will lead to more uncertainty and 
unnecessary litigation.58 
The new Kisor test directly affects the USPTO.  The Federal Circuit 
reviews cases appealed from the PTAB. While the Federal Circuit does not as 
yet regularly consider the Auer doctrine, it was the recent focus of an important 
2017 en banc opinion—Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal—and another contentious 
recent case, Facebook v. Windy City, and promises to be the subject of future 
challenges to administrative procedures before the Board, facially or on appeal 
from the merits.  But better consure Aqua, it is first important to consider the 
Federal Circuit’s role in reviewing one of the nation’s largest agencies—the 
USPTO. 
 
 50.   Id. at 2424. 
 51.   Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Kisor v. Wilkie: Auer Deference Lives On, But In What 
Form?, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL (June 27, 2019), https://www.davispolk.com/files/2019-06-
27_kisor_v_wilkie_auer_deference_lives_on_but_in_what_form.pdf. 
 52.   But see Jack Goldsmith, The Shape of the Post-Kennedy Court, Washington Examiner, July 
02, 2018, available at https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-post-
kennedy-supreme-court-isnt-likely-to-be-as-conservative-as-liberals-fear (conservative 
commenter suggesting fears of a conservative-leaning court may be premature based on an 
unpredictable political environment). 
 53.   Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2434 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (asserting that Auer deference makes 
interpretive rules binding without having to undergo the notice-and-comment procedures 
Congress built into the APA). 
 54.   Id. at 2438. 
 55.   Id. at 2439 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reiterating that agencies have their own interests 
and policy goals, and that they may choose to press the case for the side they represent instead of 
adopting the fairest and best reading). 
 56.   Id. at 2447. 
 57.   Id. 
 58.   Id. 
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III. HOW THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS APPLIED DEFERENCE TO 
THE USPTO 
A. Background of the USPTO and the PTAB 
The Department of Commerce governs the USPTO. The USPTO 
promulgates procedural rules and regulations through quasi-legislative 
proceedings; it also holds quasi-judicial adjudicatory hearings.59 Until recently, 
though, it was treated differently from other agencies by its reviewing court, 
the Federal Circuit, which had argued for decades that the USPTO did not have 
power to substantively change patent law60—and that it could only promulgate 
rules related to internal procedural issues61 and routinely finding Chevron did 
not apply.62 With the America Invents Act of 2011, however, Congress granted 
the agency the authority to set substantive standards for inter partes review 
(“IPR”), post-grant review, and derivation proceedings for agency 
adjudications;63 the Supreme Court later recognized this as conferring 
rulemaking authority upon the agency to set those standards.64 
Adjudicatory proceedings include agency determinations outside of 
the rulemaking process that aim to resolve disputes between either agencies 
and private parties or between two private parties.65 The adjudication process 
 
 59.   Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that the USPTO 
prescribes rules governing the conduct of proceedings at the USPTO). 
 60.   The Court argued that substantive patent law changes were reserved to the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court.  See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); see also Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci., 590 F.3d 1326, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (citing Animal Legal for the holding that the Patent Office “lacks substantive rulemaking 
authority”); Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same), reh’g en banc granted, 328 
F. App’x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009), appeal dismissed, Tafas v. Kappos, 586 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same). 
 61.   See id. at 1549–50 (the Federal Circuit in Kessler argued that at that time, Congress had 
only authorized the USPTO to “promulgate regulations directed only to ‘the conduct of proceedings 
in the PTO,’ but not ‘to issue substantive rules.’”). 
 62.   See, e.g., Belkin Int’l, Inc. v. Kappos, 696 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (stating that the 
Board’s interpretation of underlying patent statutes is “review[ed] de novo”); Kessler, 80 F.3d at 
1549–50; Glaxo Operations UK Ltd. v. Quigg, 894 F.2d 392, 398 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see also Sarah Tran, 
Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 616 (2012) (“The Federal Circuit . . . has assumed exclusive 
responsibility for making substantive interpretations of the Patent Act . . .”); Sapna Kumar, Expert 
Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1550 (2011). 
 63.   See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the 
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1983 (2013) (observing that the AIA’s legislative history reveals 
Congress’s intent to establish a formal adjudication process). 
 64.   See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 at 2135, 2146 (2016) (holding that 
the AIA’s regulations regarding an IPR standard granted substantive rulemaking authority); Sarah 
Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 632 (2012) [hereinafter Tran] (arguing the AIA 
conferred substantive rulemaking authority on the agency). See also Melissa F. Wasserman, The 
PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 382–
83 (2011) (arguing the Patent Office has often developed substantive patent law standards). 
 65.   See Tran, supra note 64 at 631. 
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results in an adjudicative order, which settles the dispute between the two 
parties and, if the USPTO designates the hearing as precedential per their 
guidelines, may guide agency policy.66 The USPTO has Administrative Patent 
Judges (“APJs”) who preside over adjudicatory hearings at the PTAB.67 The 
PTAB, renamed and reformed by the America Invents Act in 2012, decides 
appeals from the decisions of patent examiners and adjudicates the 
patentability of issued patents challenged by third parties in post-grant 
proceedings.68 A patent applicant whose application is rejected can appeal the 
patent examiner’s decision to the PTAB.69 Anyone other than the patent owner 
can challenge the claims of an issued patent at the PTAB. Such proceedings are 
adjudicatory hearings which take place after the USPTO grants a patent.70 
A hearing at the PTAB is an agency adjudication before a panel 
comprising of three APJs, selected based on their relevant skill and experience 
in the technical subject area at issue. The PTAB determines whether a patent is 
valid under the AIA.71 While there are multiple ways to challenge a patent 
before the PTAB, IPR is by far the most popular, accounting for 93% of all 
petitions.72 Through an IPR, a challenger can seek to cancel patent claims under 
either 35 U.S.C. § 102, which governs novelty, 73 or 35 U.S.C § 103, which 
governs obviousness.74 After Congress created the PTAB, the USPTO published 
 
 66.  See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 123–24 (5th ed. 2012) 
(explaining that legislative rulemaking can result in policy changes at federal agencies); Patent Trial 
& Appeal Bd., Standard Operating Procedure 2, Publication of Decisions and Designation or De-
designation of Decisions as Precedential or Informative, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/SOP2%20R10%20FINAL.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2019) [hereinafter SOP 2]; infra Part III-B. 
 67.   About Us, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (explaining how USPTO operates); Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patenttrialandappealboard (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2019) (same, for the PTAB). 
 68.   See generally Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1374 (2018) (explaining that IPRs fall within Congress’s Article I authority); Janet Gongola, The 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board: Who Are They and What Do They Do?, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/patent-trial-and-
appeal-board-who-are-they-and-what (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
 69.   The Patent Trial and Appeal Board: Who Are They and What Do They Do?, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/newsletter/inventors-eye/patent-trial-and-
appeal-board-who-are-they-and-what (last visited Oct. 25, 2019). 
 70.   See Tran, supra note 64 at 631. 
 71.   Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,766 (Aug. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter TPG]. 
 72.  Trial Statistics, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/ trial_statistics_20180430.pdf (showing that 10,226 of the 11,046 
petitions filed between September 16, 2012 and January 31, 2020 were IPRs). 
 73.   A patent is not novel under § 102 if there is prior art, such as a previous invention, that 
discloses the claimed invention.  35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 74.   A claimed invention is considered obvious under § 103 if the combination of elements in 
the claimed invention would be obvious to someone having experience in that subject area.  35 
U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402 (2007). 
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the Office Trial Practice Guide (“TPG”) in the Federal Register, with the purpose 
of alerting the public to the procedures and timeline for proceedings at the 
PTAB, including IPRs.75 
B. Deference to USPTO Decisions and Guidance 
The USPTO occasionally issues informal rules promulgated through 
notice-and-comment meant to bind the agency.76 Such rules clarify agency 
practices by implementing the industry expertise of those working at the 
USPTO.77 Rules promulgated through notice-and-comment have the binding 
force of law.78 More often, the USPTO relies on guidance and policy statements, 
which gives attorneys more information on how to apply the rules 
promulgated, but are not supposed to bind parties, either outside the agency, 
or before it.79 
The USPTO Director has adopted the practice of occasionally 
designating routine adjudication as precedential or informative, or elevating 
certain issues to a special precedential panel.80 A precedential decision is meant 
to establish binding rules over other parts of the agency.81 To designate a PTAB 
decision as precedential, the full Board is given the opportunity to review and 
vote on the opinion, and the Director must approve the designation.82  
Alternatively, they may use the Precedential Opinion Panel to designate certain 
disputes and their outcomes of special precedential relevance. An informative 
decision, in contrast, is meant to guide parties and the Board on frequently 
recurring issues and provides a representative sample of outcomes on a 
matter.83 The USPTO clearly has the authority to issue notice-and-comment 
regulations for procedural issues, which govern standards for IPRs, term of art 
 
 75.   See TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 76.   Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-
Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1312-13 (1992) (clarifying 
that to have binding authority, rules should be accompanied by a notice-and-comment period).  In 
contrast, interpretive rules interpret statutory language which has some tangible meaning to the 
agency.  Id. at 1312. 
 77.   See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019) (noting agencies have unique technical 
expertise to regulate in complex or changing circumstances). 
 78.   Id. at 1315. 
 79.   Id. at 1315 (pointing out that guidance documents are policy statements and are not 
meant to have the binding force of law); see Examination Guidance and Training Materials, UNITED 
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-
regulations/examination-policy/examination-guidance-and-training-materials (last visited Nov. 3, 
2019); see Anthony, supra note 76, at 1384. 
 80.   See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); SOP 2, supra note 66, at 1. 
 81.   SOP 2, supra note 66, at 2–3, 11. 
 82.   Id.; Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1301 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 83.   SOP 2, supra note 66, at 9. 
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definitions, and claim construction.84 
Historically, the Federal Circuit has deferred to the Director’s decisions 
and Board rulings unless the interpretation is “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.”85 However, following Supreme Court 
precedent, the Federal Circuit has vested the Director’s decisions with neither 
Chevron deference (when the USPTO regulation “merely parrots the statutory 
language”) nor Auer deference (when the USPTO interprets such a 
regulation).86 
In a recent case Federal Circuit case, Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, the court 
examined Auer deference vis-a-vis PTAB decisions.87 Aqua Products, Inc. 
owned U.S. Patent 8,273,183 (the ‘183 patent) which disclosed an automated 
jet-propelled swimming pool cleaner without an electric drive motor.88 A 
competitor, Zodiac Pool Systems, petitioned the PTAB for IPR on certain claims 
of the ‘183 patent, claiming that it was invalid as both non-novel and obvious.89 
Aqua then moved to substitute some of the challenged claims with amended 
claims, in compliance with § 316(d), but the PTAB denied Aqua’s motion 
because Aqua had failed to prove that the substitute claims were patentable.90 
Aqua appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that under § 316(e)’s plain 
language, it did not have to prove patentability.91 The three-judge panel 
rejected Aqua’s argument, concluding that the PTAB had allocated the burden 
of patentability to the patentee.92 The Federal Circuit then granted Aqua’s 
petition for rehearing en banc to decide whether the USPTO requires patent 
 
 84.   See Kessler, 80 F.3d at 1549–1550 (arguing the USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking 
authority); but see Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (finding that the 
USPTO’s substantive claim construction standard was reasonable and finding they had rulemaking 
authority to issue it); TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) (promulgating rules related 
to IPRs through notice-and-comment); see infra Part IV-Error! Reference source not found.. 
 85.   Eli Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Washington, 334 F.3d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (holding the Director’s interpretation of a rule to require a “two-way test” to determine 
whether two parties claimed the same invention was an interpretation of the Director’s own 
regulations, and so that interpretation was controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation).  Id.; see also Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V. v. Cardiac Sci. Operating Co., 590 
F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2010); B.E. Tech., LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2015-1827, 2016 WL 6803057, 
at *7 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 2016). 
 86.   Power Integrations, Inc. v. Semiconductor Components Indus., LLC, 926 F.3d 1306, 1318 
(Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that an agency does not need special authority to interpret its own words 
when formulating a regulation.) 
 87.   872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 88.   Id. at 1297. 
 89.   Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 90.   Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1297; 35 U.S.C § 316(d) (2012) (explaining that in an IPR, the 
patent owner may file a motion to amend to either cancel the challenged patent claims or to 
substitute different claims for the challenged ones). 
 91.   35 U.S.C § 316(e) (2012) (disclosing that in an IPR, the petitioner shall have the burden 
of proving unpatentability). 
 92.   Aqua Prods., 823 F.3d at 1373. 
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owner to bear the burden of persuasion regarding the patentability of amended 
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 316(e).93 
In a five-judge plurality opinion spanning 135 pages, the Federal Circuit 
agreed that the burden of persuasion regarding the patentability of amended 
claims was on the petitioner, but the court was deeply divided on how to reach 
that conclusion.94 In her plurality opinion, Judge O’Malley explained that 
Congress, through the AIA, granted rulemaking authority to the Director of the 
Patent Office under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a).95 Invoking this authority, the Director 
promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 and § 42.20.96 The first rule, 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 
(Rule 42.121), clarifies 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) by setting boundaries for patent 
owners in seeking to amend their claims. The second, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20 (Rule 
42.20), governs motion practices before the PTAB.97 The USPTO argued these 
provisions state that the burden of persuasion for patentability is on the patent 
owner, and that it must rest there, given that the patentability of amended 
claims depends on “prior art not already part of the IPR.”98 The Director also 
endorsed this interpretation, but argued that the interpretation should be 
accorded Auer deference.99  
In its argument, the USPTO referenced two recent PTAB decisions, Idle 
Free v. Bergstrom, Inc.100 and MasterImage v. RealD Inc.,101 which stated that the 
ultimate burden of persuasion regarding the question of patentability is on the 
patent owner.102 However, as Judge O’Malley pointed out, neither Rule 42.20 
nor Rule 42.121 set forth specific requirements regarding the patent owner’s 
burden.103 The comments in the Federal Register did not mention the burden 
of persuasion, and neither Idle Free nor MasterImage were published in the 
Federal Register, rendering them lacking the force and effect of law.104 Neither 
 
 93.   Id. at 1297. 
 94.   Id. at 1296. 
 95.   Id. at 1297; 35 U.S.C § 316(a) (2012) (explaining that the Director can prescribe 
regulations governing IPRs). 
 96.   Inter Partes Review: Amendment of the Patent, 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 (2018); Petition and 
Motion Practices: Generally, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20 (2018). 
 97.   Petition and Motion Practices: Generally, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20 (2018).  Any relief requested 
must be in a motion, and the moving party must prove that it is entitled to such relief.  Id. 
 98.   Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1301. 
 99.   Id. 
 100.   No. IPR2012–00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013). 
 101.   No. IPR2015–00040, 2015 WL 10709290, at *2–4 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015). 
 102.   See Idle Free Sys., Inc., IPR2012–00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 (examining 35 U.S.C. 
§ 316(d) and discussing the requirement that an amendment may be denied when a claim 
introduces new matter, and must contain patentable distinctions over the prior art of record 
without mentioning Rule 42.121 or Rule 42.20); MasterImage 3D, Inc., IPR2015–00040, 2015 WL 
10709290, at *2–4 (clarifying Idle Free by providing policy explanations for its previous decision 
without mentioning Rule 42.121 or Rule 42.20). 
 103.   Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1301. 
 104.   Id. at 1301.  The USPTO also designated the decision as informative, which is not binding.  
Id. 
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informative nor precedential decisions thus received any deference.105 In 
dissent, Judge Hughes, joined by Judge Chen, opined that the USPTO should be 
accorded Auer deference over their interpretation of the regulation itself 
because its interpretation was not “plainly erroneous” and was also the most 
reasonable reading of Rule 42.20.106 
Aqua Products illustrates plainly that the Federal Circuit is divided as 
how to apply Auer deference, even under the less penetrating “plainly 
erroneous” standard.107 Given that divide, how they will deal with a tangled 
Kisor ruling more complicated than what came before is anyone’s guess. 
And, while practitioners have stressed Auer’s utility,108 the more 
complicated the Auer/Kisor standard gets, the more difficult it is likely to be to 
apply, leading to more confusion and more needless litigation.109 At bottom, the 
new Kisor standard is more labyrinthine than the previous “plainly erroneous” 
standard, and thus may not be as effective as before. And as shown in Aqua 
Products, the Federal Circuit is still divided on how apply even the earlier Auer 
formulation to USPTO proceedings—there, the court grants deference to some 
forms of agency decision-making—like rulemaking, in some instances—but not 
others (like adjudication).110 
More recently, the Federal Circuit decided Facebook v. Windy City 
Innovations, LLC, though the finality and authority of that ruling itself is up for 
debate.111  That case addressed the deference the USPTO should be offered in 
its interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 315(c), which outlines joinder rules in IPR 
proceedings.112  There the Court held that even under Chevron, the court owes 
an agency’s interpretation of the law no deference unless, after employing 
 
 105.   Id. at 1316; see supra note 66, at 9 (clarifying that informative decisions are only meant 
to provide norms for recurring issues, not to be binding on the agency). 
 106.   Id. at 1358 (Hughes, J., dissenting).  Judge Hughes also suggested there may have been no 
comments on Rule 42.20 or Rule 42.121 on the burden of persuasion for patentability because it 
may have been the “broadest and most accepted idea.  Id.  He opined that excessive notices will 
hinder the effectiveness of agency proceedings, and “upend administrative law as we know it.”  Id.  
at 1365. 
 107.   Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 453 (1997). 
 108.   Kristen E. Hickman & Mark Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
HEADNOTES 103, 109 (2019) [hereinafter Hickman & Thomson](stating that Auer’s defenders 
contend it “(1) simplifies the judicial task; (2) ensures that courts across the country give the same 
meaning to ambiguous regulations; and (3) allows regulated parties to more accurately forecast 
how courts will construe ambiguous regulations”). 
 109.   Id. at 104. 
 110.   Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1358; Hickman & Thomson, supra note 108, at 
105. 
 111.   953 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2020), add’l briefing granted, No. 18-1400, Doc. 102 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 30, 2020) (granting additional post-opinion briefing regarding whether Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-
Call Technologies, LP,140 S. Ct. 1367 (2020) 
 merits granting, vacating, and remanding the original opinion as ruling on an unappealable issue). 
 112.   35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2012).  Even if the decision is ultimately held to have been ultra vires, 
it stands as another example of how the appellate court will apply deference questions to the 
agency’s rulemaking procedures. 
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traditional tools of statutory construction, the court finds itself unable to 
discern Congress’s meaning.113  Here, Chief Judge Prost held that the statute’s 
language was clear and unambiguous, and the USPTO was therefore not 
entitled to any deference.114  And even if the Federal Circuit were to offer 
deference to the USPTO, the decision would have to be designated as 
precedential and reflect the PTAB’s expertise, not just resolve a “pure question 
of law.”115  This case shows how the Federal Circuit addresses deference 
doctrines, and gives the USPTO the opportunity to update its rulemaking 
procedures if it wants to be offered deference in the future.116 
Windy City Innovations also, and most relevantly here, included 
“additional views” from the entire panel, Chief Judge Sharon Prost, Judge Jay 
Plager, and Judge Kathleen O’Malley (as authored by Judge O’Malley).  That 
section, which is best thought of as dicta to the opinion, made the point to 
alternatively review the precedential status of the PTAB’s Precedential Opinion 
Panel (“POP”) ruling in Proppant Express Investments, LLC v. Oren Technologies, 
LLC,117 and whether those panel opinions should receive deference, whether 
Chevron or Skidmore.118 The panel found that they should receive neither: 
“[W]e would find that no deference is due to the POP opinion in Proppant.” 
The panel noted that Congress delegated certain rulemaking authority to 
the Director” to “specifically” “prescribe regulations.”119  They noted that “The 
express delegation of rulemaking authority, thus, is for the Director to 
promulgate regulations governing the conduct of IPRs,” and “not a delegation 
of authority to issue adjudicative decisions interpreting statutory provisions of 
the AIA.”120  They did not mince words: “[J]ust as we give no deference to 
nonprecedential Board decisions, we see no reason to afford deference to POP 
opinions.”121 
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, the panel found that the panel 
rulings and procedures were not promulgated through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, and that the procedures and commentary from the public laid 
down was insufficient: “There is no formal opportunity for public comment,” 
they found; and “POP opinions, once decided, are not published in the Federal 
Register,” thus “the POP decision may not be subject to judicial review at all.”122  
 
 113.   953 F.3d at 1328. 
 114.   Id. 
 115.   Id. at 1338, 1342 (Prost, C.J., filing additional views) (explaining that the Federal Circuit 
has never offered deference to nonprecedential PTAB decisions, and will not defer to the USPTO on 
issues that do not reflect its specific expertise). 
 116.  See supra Part IV. 
 117.  No. IPR2018-00914, Paper 38 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2019). 
 118.  953 F.3d at 1337. 
 119.  Id. at 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 1340. 
 122.  Id. 
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All which made them unworthy of Chevron deference, as they lacked the force 
or effect of law.  And given that the statute was unambiguous, the court did not 
find the POP panels should be afforded Skidmore deference, either.  While the 
precedential effect of that ruling itself is in doubt, the persuasive authority of 
those additional views is worth noting as consistent with our analysis here. 
IV. RECOMMENDED USPTO RULEMAKING PROCEDURES 
POST-KISOR 
After Kisor was handed down, administrative law scholars quickly 
weighed in: many warned existing deference doctrines were clearly on the 
chopping block.123 While uncertainty persists, if the USPTO acts now to adapt 
to the new framework, it can still ensconce and defend its decisions following 
Kisor, as opposed to finding their rulings routinely reversed de novo.124 In short, 
the USPTO has options to meet Kisor’s criteria; given the Federal Circuit’s 
admonitions in Windy City, it would behoove the agency to act quickly to 
address the perceived deficiencies in their rulemaking processes. 
First, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court held that procedural 
rules governing the conduct of an IPR may earn Chevron deference, if properly 
promulgated.125 In sum, if they are notice-and-comment rules, they would be 
more likely to receive Auer deference because they would (1) be the agency’s 
official and authoritative position; (2) implicate its substantive expertise; and 
(3) reflect its fair and considered judgment due to the comment period, meeting 
the Kisor test. 
To date, the USPTO has published very few of the rules governing the 
Board, the precedential opinion process, or the supposedly binding rulings they 
list on their website via notice-and-comment. This runs the risk of frequent 
reversal and scrutiny from the Courts, as seen on display in Windy City. The 
USPTO should publish updates to the TPG and the Standard Operating 
Procedure (“SOP 2”) in the Federal Register as Notices of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NPRMs”), pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking, both to ensure that 
the public has proper notice of and can address their concerns with the 
 
 123.   E.g., Eric S. Schmitt, Kisor v. Wilkie—a Swing and a Miss, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 12:46 
PM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-kisor-v-wilkie-a-swing-and-a-miss/ 
(stating Kisor missed the chance to restore the role of federalism and separation of powers in 
administrative law); Corbin K. Barthold & Cory L. Andrews, A Small Win for James Kisor; a Big Loss 
for the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 2:19 PM) (noting the fight over Auer deference 
toward ambiguous regulations may be lost, but the fight over deference under Chevron is surely on 
the horizon); Kristen E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron 
Deference, 70 ALA. L. REV. 733, 735 (discussing how Justice Gorsuch fervently disagrees with 
Chevron deference); Hickman & Thomas supra note 108. 
 124.   See infra Part IV-Error! Reference source not found.-C. 
 125.   Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2135, 2146 (2016) (holding that the USPTO’s regulation regarding 
an IPR standard was a reasonable exercise of rulemaking authority granted to the agency by 
statute). 
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updates—given the serious substantive rights both affect across thousands of 
disputes—but more importantly, to grant them judicial deference on appeal, 
and to ensure they are not quickly reversed or rescinded by subsequent 
administrations.126 It should do the same for any POP rulings interpreting its 
own rules and regulations. 
The TPG, for example, was originally published in the Federal Register 
in 2012 and came with a notice-and-comment period.127 Since then, the TPG 
has undergone a number of changes,128 none of which were adopted through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking—they were simply posted to the USPTO’s 
website and listed in the Federal Register without allowing any comment, and 
without filing an NPRM.129 The PTAB can ensure that it receives appropriate 
(or indeed, any) deference on appeal by subjecting the updates to notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedures,130 because they would be the agency’s 
official position, implicate its substantive expertise, and reflect its fair and 
considered judgment.131 As it stands, the updates to the TPG—in particular the 
July 2019132 update, which has had a dramatic impact on the number of 
discretionary denials by the Board,133 reversed six years of accepted Board 
 
 126.   See infra Part IV-Error! Reference source not found.. 
 127.   See TPG, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012) (stating that the USPTO published several 
notices of proposed rulemaking in February 2012 and requested written comments on its proposed 
implementation of the new trial proceedings of the AIA). 
 128.  Patent Trial & Appeal Bd., Trial Practice Guide Update (July 2019), USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2019). 
 129.   See generally id. (showing that the USPTO trial practice guide updates are only posted 
online and do not undergo notice-and-comment procedures). 
 130.   See THE WHITE HOUSE, EXECUTIVE ORDER ON PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH IMPROVED 
AGENCY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS (2019) (explaining that to have the binding effect of law, guidance 
documents should be subject to a notice-and-comment period to allow the public to voice their 
concerns). 
 131.   Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2417 (2019). 
 132.  PTAB TRIAL PRACTICE GUIDE UPDATE (July 2019 Update), https://www.uspto.gov/ 
sites/default/files/documents/trial-practice-guide-update3.pdf?MURL=, noticed in Office Patent 
Trial Practice Guide, July 2019 Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,925 (July 16, 2019), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/16/2019-15083/office-patent-trial-
practice-guide-july-2019-update. 
 133.   Indeed, internal data from Unified Patents, LLC shows that almost 9% of petitions 
decided on were denied institution under the Director’s discretionary authority (35 U.S.C. § 314) 
in the 2019 calendar year—more than double the previous year—resulting in over 100 petitions 
being denied for non-substantive reasons.  See Andrew Dietrick and Jonathan Stroud, Rules to Bind 
You: Problems with the USPTO’s Recent PTAB Rulemaking Procedures (forthcoming 2020) (on file 
with author) (data on file with author).  Another article in this volume notes a number of those 
denials came from parties filings multiple petitions on a patent at the same time—a practice once 
widely accepted, but now de facto prohibited under the new rules.  See Monica Grewal, Heather 
Petruzzi, and Wenli Gu, Ranking Parallel Petitions before the PTAB: A Survey, CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. (forthcoming 2020) (counting cases since the July 2019 update). 
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practice, and has laid down de facto filing rules—do not.134  The sua sponte July 
2019 TPG updates in particular are vulnerable to searching appellate review 
and direct facial challenge. 
The USPTO also publishes a Standard Operating Procedure guide (SOP, 
in relevant part, SOP 2), which includes guidance for determining whether a 
PTAB decision is precedential or informative.135 But the SOP has never gone 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.136 Therefore, the Federal Circuit will 
likely only view it as interpretive guidance, and will not defer to the agency on 
it;137 it also cannot carry the force and effect of law, nor can its progeny. That 
would mean that any precedential case the Board relies on carries no weight 
and the designation itself lacks the force and effect of law, and the PTAB judges 
are free to ignore it as lacking the force and effect of law. To ensure consistent 
application of those rules, the PTAB should promulgate its Standard Operating 
Procedure—and its precedential opinions—via notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. 
To wit—and because it is a ready example of well-handled 
administrative change—the USPTO should use its successful Covered Business 
Method program under the AIA as a model for how it updates its programs and 
ensures they have the force and effect of law.138 
A. The Covered Business Method Program as a Case Study 
Under the AIA, certain patents directed to business methods are 
eligible for the Covered Business Method (CBM) review program.139 As part of 
this program, the USPTO published a definition of a “technological invention” 
in the Federal Register.140 Despite receiving numerous comments, which it 
addressed at length, the USPTO settled on the as-noticed definition as the most 
reasonable solution.141 Nonetheless, the rule—if challenged in court—would 
 
 134.   Id. at 2420 (defining that courts always have the final authority to approve an agency’s 
interpretation of that notice-and-comment rule). 
 135.   SOP 2, supra note 66, at 2–3, 9, 11. 
 136.   See id. (showing that the Standard Operating Procedures are only published online and 
that they did not undergo any notice-and-comment period). 
 137.   Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (declining to give 
deference to an interpretive and informative decision); see generally SOP 2, supra note 66, at 8 
(explaining that the Federal Circuit does not have a duty to defer to interpretive guidance). 
 138.   See infra Part IV-B. 
 139.  Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, 
and Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,687 (Aug. 
14, 2012). 
 140.   Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definitions of Covered 
Business Method Patent and Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,734, 48735 (Aug. 14, 2012) 
(discussing the comment process, and showing that the final definition was published as a rule in 
37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b)). 
 141.   Compare Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definition of 
Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 7,095, 7,096 (Feb. 10, 2012) with Transitional Program for 
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receive Chevron deference as being the plain product of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, as intended to have the force and effect of law, and as interpreting 
a plainly ambiguous statutory term. 
The USPTO could easily have engaged in the same exercise for the 
PTAB TPG and SOP 2 guidelines, and it should for any future updates it hopes 
to have the force and effect of law. The USPTO should, too, solicit comments 
from the public surrounding any planned updates to these guidelines, even if it 
eventually adopts the proposed updates without modifications, as it did for the 
CBM program.142 It can do either formally or informally, but collecting public 
comments and an administrative record justifying any change in the rules is 
critical. Duly promulgating the TPG and SOP 2 will give more weight to critical 
rules and will give the USPTO a better chance of receiving deferential treatment 
from the Federal Circuit when the next agency decree is challenged. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Kisor reshapes Auer deference, and the Federal Circuit 
must now use the Supreme Court’s multi-factor, multi-step test,143 which is a 
complicated framework that may create more litigation than it resolves.144 
Given the changes in the composition of the Supreme Court and the complexity 
of Auer following Kisor, Auer deference might soon be replaced entirely by the 
wafer-thin Skidmore respect.145 
As evidenced in Aqua Products, the Federal Circuit was already bitterly 
divided on how to apply Auer.146  Windy City showed the reservations the 
Circuit has with the lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking attendant in their 
administration.  And Kisor seems unlikely to untie those knots. To stave off 
future challenges, the PTAB should seek to ground their most important rules 
in notice and comment rulemaking and should ensure those cases actually 
interpret the rules the USPTO promulgated in the way the USPTO says they 
do.147 Precedential cases, to receive any form of deference, should be based on 
rules and regulations promulgated through notice-and-comment. 
As Kisor imposes a higher and more tortured standard than Auer, the 
USPTO should simply step up and start promulgating more rules in the Federal 
Register pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking, such as their TPG and 
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SOP guide, to receive deference.148 (They should also seek to comply with the 
Paperwork Reduction Act and a number of Trump Administration Executive 
Orders they seem to be ignoring, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.)149 
Kisor may seem like small potatoes, but it represents a shift in the 
landscape of administrative law that will be felt for years to come. Auer’s (and 
perhaps Chevron’s) days are most certainty numbered. 
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